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“Web 2.0” is sometimes used as a slogan or buzzword. It is fuzzy1 and refers
to a set of realities and situations that resist exhaustive definition.2 Web 2.0 has
some emblematic features, and includes a constellation of functions with shared
characteristics, in particular, a high level of user involvement in content production.
Web 2.0 is also associated with structured environments in which content is largely
user-generated, such as collective publication sites like Wikipedia. Such sites allow
cybernauts to edit and change content as they wish. In other cases, applications and
content can be combined and websites can be synchronized with other websites.3
Content-sharing sites, such as YouTube and Dailymotion, allow cybernauts to pub-
lish content online. Social networks, such as Facebook and MySpace, allow indi-
viduals to publish their personal profiles and information about other people.4 Ni-
colas Vermeys notes that the Web 2.0 notion “designates the trend among some
companies on the Web towards publishing user-generated content rather than em-
ploying the traditional business model of putting proprietary media content
online.”5
With the Internet, users have long been able to put content online but, on the
legal level, what seems special about Web 2.0 is the user’s role, which is more
active than ever. The notion of Web 2.0 refers to a series of legal situations in
* Study conducted within the research program of the L.R. Wilson Chair in Information
Technology and E-Commerce Law and as part of a research project sponsored by the
Quebecor Foundation.
** Professor and holder of the L.R. Wilson Chair in Information Technology and E-
Commerce Law, Centre de recherche en droit public, Faculty of Law, Université de
Montréal, pierre.trudel@umontreal.ca.
1 Philippe Chantepie, “Éléments d’économie du Web 2.0: interfaces, bases de données,
plates-formes” (2007) 24 Propriétés intellectuelles 285.
2 Dion Hinchcliffe, “Review of the Year’s Best Web 2.0 Explanations”, online: (2006)
Web 2.0 Journal <http://web2.sys-con.com/node/165914/>.
3 Mary Madden & Susannah Fox, “Riding the Waves of ‘Web 2.0’. More than a
Buzzword, but Still Not Easily Defined”, online: (2006) Pew Internet
<http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2006/Riding-the-Waves-of-Web-20/Riding-the-
Waves/Backgrounder.aspx?r=1>; Lisa Veasman, “‘Piggy Backing’ on the Web 2.0 In-
ternet: Copyright Liability and Web 2.0 Mashups” (2008) 30 Comm/Ent 311–337.
4 Steven James, “Social Networking Sites: Regulating the Online ‘Wild West’ of Web
2.0” (2008) 2 Ent. L.R. 47–50.
5 Nicolas W. Vermeys, “Chronique-Responsabilité civile et Web 2.0” (July 2007)
Repères, online: <http://rejb.editionsyvonblais.com/> [translated by author].
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which roles seem less stable and have fuzzier boundaries. The realities associated
with Web 2.0 are constantly changing and can be beyond the reach of state legisla-
tion. Given such an plethora of categories, we cannot restrict ourselves to a simple
exegesis of promulgated state laws if we hope to describe the kind of regulation
that could operate in environments associated with Web 2.0.
Some phenomena modulate the norms established by states and other Internet
stakeholders, and prevent them from being enforced across the whole network. De-
spite the network’s global nature, there are major differences in interpretations and
values in the many cultural milieus in which rules apply.6 Such phenomena prevent
rules from being applied when they are out of context owing to the situation or
cultural substrate. One such phenomenon seems to be legal risk.7 Stakeholders’ ap-
praisals of the concrete possibility that national legislation and other rules will ef-
fectively apply to their activities are factors that explain why the Internet may be a
global network but no one feels required to comply with all national laws that could
theoretically apply.
In order to describe the law relating to Web 2.0, we have to look at the norma-
tivity that really operates there. Effective norms engender strong enough risks for
stakeholders that they find it in their interest to comply. State legislation is not the
only thing that governs Internet activities; the normativity that governs the re-
sources associated with Web 2.0 flows from what the technology permits and pro-
hibits, and also largely from stakeholder practices. Configurations and practices
create risk or shift risk onto others. However, state regulators may consider that the
risks arising out of Internet activities are worrisome enough that the state should
impose obligations on stakeholders and thus modulate what they can do online.
Through their regulations, states create risks for stakeholders.
When Web 2.0 is seen as a network, its regulation8 can be described as active
normativity resulting from risk management decisions made by regulators and
stakeholders on the Net. On the Internet, governments, users, companies and other
stakeholders manage risks. Through their decisions and behaviour, all normativity
producers create risks flowing from the norms that apply to them, and relay those
risks to co-contractors and partners. Norm producers cannot claim sovereignty in
6 Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless
World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) at c. 9.
7 On legal risk analysis methodology, see: Kienle, H., et al., “Managing Legal Risks
Associated with Intellectual Property on the Web” (2008) 3 Int. J. Bus. Inf. Syst.
86–106, online: <http://www.inderscience.com/offer.php?id=16055>; Jan Trzaskow-
ski, “Legal Risk Management in a Global Electronic Marketplace”, (2006) 49 Scandi-
navian Studies in Law, 319–337; Franck Verdun, La gestion des risques juridiques
(Paris: Éditions d’organisation, 2006) at 39ff.
8 Thomas Schultz, Réguler le commerce électronique par la résolution des litiges en
ligne (Brussels: Brulant, 2005) at 162 —  Schultz reports the points of views of the
Mission interministérielle français sur l’Internet and the Conseil supérieur de
l’audiovisuel français. He describes the findings of Marc Maesschalck & Tom
Dedeurwaerdere, “Autorégulation, éthique procédurale et gouvernance de la société de
l’information” in Jacques Berleur, Christophe Lazaro & Robert Queck, eds.,
Gouvernance de la société de l’information (Brussels: Bruylant-Presses Universitaires
de Namur, 2002) at 77–103.
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cyberspace, but they retain complete power to set rules that create risks for
stakeholders.
I. RISKS AND STAKES FLOWING FROM FUNCTIONS
ASSOCIATED WITH WEB 2.0
Even more than the first-generation Web, Web 2.0’s prime feature is the om-
nipresence of the network. Resulting from constant interactions among stakehold-
ers, Web 2.0 looks like a network made up of nodes that sometimes take the form
of sites, sometimes users, and sometimes public and private regulators. Each node
has the capacity to make rules and impose them on other interconnected stakehold-
ers. The ability to impose rules on other bodies in the network follows from the
amount of risk the node can generate for those with which it is inter-related.
Web 2.0 raises questions about the legal frameworks that apply to it because it
involves risks and stakes that seem new. Since it removes boundaries and erases
categories, the issues it raises are often perceived as a change in the scale of the risk
that is inherent to online communication. Normativity creates, accentuates, reduces
and transfers risk. Risks flowing from norms are in this respect legal risks.
(a) Risk on a Different Scale
Web 2.0 may not be entirely new, but it seems to shine a more dramatic light
on the stakes and risks inherent to online environments. While the risks it involves
are not necessarily novel, they seem to be greater. Franklin Brousse says that Web
2.0
. . . repositions the cybernaut at the heart of the Web. It changes the legal
risks and responsibilities most often related to website operation. By using
the tools and technology of new Web 2.0 services to create, organize and
freely share within a community all forms of content (text, audio and vis-
ual), every cybernaut becomes an author and/or editor of content, and must
shoulder new responsibility related to both his or her new creations and the
way they he or she uses the creations of others.9
The user’s greater role shifts and increases the number of locations where
risks and stakes arise, many of which have legal aspects. Owing to the active role
they play, users become nodes of normativity that other stakeholders are required to
take into account. Decisions made by Web 2.0 users are more likely than those of
first-generation Internet users to have consequences for third parties. However,
since the Web 2.0 environment does not have a central body that shoulders respon-
sibility, the legal framework ends up being described as a set of risks distributed
across an undetermined number of stakeholders of different sizes and statuses.
Risk is also on a different scale because of quantitative and qualitative
changes in information publication. The Internet makes information circulation
commonplace. Data can easily be published outside of legitimate circles, which
9 “Web 2.0: un point complet sur les aspects juridiques”, online: (17 May 2005) In-
dexel.net
<http://www.indexel.net/1_6_4523__3_/9/33/1/Web_2.0___un_point_complet_sur_les
_aspects_juridiques.htm> [translated by author].
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increases risk.10 Web 2.0 environments change the spatial and temporal reference
points that make it possible to identify legitimate and legal areas of information
circulation. Web 2.0’s many functions provide access to information that, until re-
cently, was meant to circulate in restricted areas. Paradigms that were designed in a
world where networks took up less space are inadequate in Web 2.0.11
The changes in the size of the stakes show how much evolution there has been
in the level of risk caused by information circulation in the network. The new
dimensions of risk are giving legislation new purposes. We may require regulatory
tools that reflect the fact that relay processes and risk transfers occur in a network.
The Internet changes the spatial scale used to assess risk. Outside of the
networked world, gaining access to information can require a major investment in
resources. On the Internet, much information is just a search query away.12 Such
easy access makes information commonplace and increases the risk of things being
taken out of context.
Time is also becoming less central: the persistence of information means that
it can cross out of the time-spaces in which it can be held legitimately. For exam-
ple, it can be legitimate for information to be available to the public owing to the
topicality of an event. However, archiving and virtually permanent availability on
the Internet gives it a persistence that extends beyond what is necessary to make
sense of the news.
The ability to accumulate information makes it possible to create large depos-
its of information on people that could then be used by the police or wrongdoers. In
sum, the fact that less effort is needed to find information erodes what used to be a
kind of protection by default for many basic rights, such as the right to privacy and
freedom from attacks on reputation.
(b) The Primary Categories of Stakes and Risks
Regulation of Web 2.0 is part of the fabric of the requirements related to mod-
ulating and managing risks. Those who take part in Web 2.0 activities do so more
or less frequently depending on whether they are aware of how much risk they have
to carry. Technological configurations, modes of operation, applicable norms and
the topics involved in a Web 2.0 environment are all factors that can give rise to,
increase or limit stakeholders’ risk.
While it seems impossible to compile an abstract list of all the stakes and risks
that can arise from operating a Web 2.0 site, we can identify the major categories of
those that most stakeholders would want to consider in order to make decisions.
Generically, Web 2.0 environments involve risks relating to behaviour, technologi-
cal and ergonomic configuration, and regulation. Management of one kind of risk
can create or accentuate the risks associated with the other categories.
10 Karl D. Belgum, “Who leads at Half-time?: Three Conflicting Visions of Internet Pri-
vacy Policy” (1999) 6 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 1.
11 Frederick Schauer, “Internet Privacy and the Public-Private Distinction” (1998) 38
Jurimetrics 555.
12 Daniel J. Solove, “Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitu-
tion” (2002) 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1137 at 1139.
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(i) Risks Related to Behaviour
Behavioural risks flow from the conduct of the cybernauts who interact on the
site. Practices that can infringe on the rights of other people are those that most
often come to mind.
Risks to reputation — With Web 2.0, it is easy to speak about oneself and
others, and to make such comments almost universally available. Mechanisms that
protect the right to freedom from attacks on reputation take into account the context
in which comments are published and assess their defamatory nature in relation to
the meaning given to them in the circumstances of publication. Thus, a comment
about an individual’s professional actions may be licit within a restricted circle.
However, the same comment may be defamatory if brought to the attention of a
third party. Many Web 2.0 environments, such as social networking sites, provide
unprecedented means of bringing comments about private life into the public
sphere. Courts in Canada have considered the scope of dissemination of defamatory
comments on the Internet in their assessment of damages.13
Risks to privacy — Many Web 2.0 applications have the potential to break the
boundaries separating what is held as private or as shared within only a small cir-
cle, and information available to the broader public. For example, on a social
networking site, one can publish information about oneself, but also about one’s
contacts. Such information can be disclosed through comments. Our contacts can
also put information about us on their own personal sites.
Personal information revealed on a social networking site can be used in many
ways. For example, companies can use information to test markets, sexual
predators can find potential victims by searching for vulnerable profiles, and pro-
spective employers can surf personal spaces to learn more about applicants before
hiring.14
Accumulation and agglomeration of data on individuals by sites with user-
generated content and use of other Internet functions means that large repositories
of information can be available for surveillance activities of all kinds. This is a risk
that seems inherent to the way the Internet operates today.
Risks to the right to be asked for consent to release an image — The stakes
involved in publishing images obviously concern intellectual property rights, but
they also bring into play an individual’s right to oppose the publication of their
image without their consent or in circumstances other than in the public interest or
the interest of people close to the individual.
Risks to intellectual property — As applications that enable users to publish
content on websites become more commonplace, intellectual property risks in-
crease. Users can copy works without authorization and then publish them on a site
without authorization. The legal principles that are brought into question by this
kind of activity are not new, but the scope of the problem and the ease with which
13 Southam v. Chelekis, 2000 BCCA 112.
14 Susan B. Barnes, “A Privacy Paradox: Social Networking in the United States” (2006)
11 First Monday, online:
<http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue11_9/barnes/index.html> (visited on 4 June
2007).
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it is now possible to publish content raise major challenges. The risk of infringe-
ment of intellectual property rights seems greater.15
Risks of publication of illegal content — The more decision-making centres
there are with respect to publication on the net, the greater the risk that illegal con-
tent will be published.
On sites with user-generated content, risk flows mainly from the behaviour of
cybernauts. In such cases, there is a multitude of decision centres that are all able to
publish information from their own perspectives. The amateur’s increased role in
situations that used to be dominated by professionals tends to blur the borders be-
tween producers and consumers, which makes determining status and responsibility
all the more problematic.16
The infinite number of possible situations, the difficulty in identifying those in
which laws are violated, and the fact that users are crucial factors makes the legal
risk analysis a useful approach. In a world where the network seems omnipresent in
human activity, it is less and less realistic to give a specific status to each user. User
behaviour can depend on a wide range of highly volatile variables that can affect
the legal status of what users do. Risk analysis makes it possible to re-establish a
degree of legal and normative predictability.
(ii) Risks Related to Configuration
Web 2.0 environments involve some risks that do not flow exclusively from
the intention or behaviour of the site administrator or users. The way that environ-
ments are configured can make it easier to perform actions that may be illegal. For
example, the technical facility with which it is possible to put content on a blog or
site where audio and video documents are shared is in itself a source of risk. Such
default normativity facilitates actions that could easily contravene other rules, such
as those pertaining to intellectual property.
The breadth the Internet and the power of information processing functions
mean that the cyberspace environment involves increased risks that have to be
managed within the network. For example, attention has often been drawn to the
brawn of information aggregation tools and the astonishing abilities of search en-
gines.17 Information, even when it is public, can easily be found and then combined
so as to deduce private information. Thus, risks to privacy are on a different scale
on the Internet. This kind of phenomenon requires risk management that necessa-
rily operates in a network.
The very configuration of the Internet, which ignores territorial borders, en-
genders risks. For example, many Web 2.0 functions make it possible to use infor-
mation out of context. The design of personal networking sites is based on recogni-
tion that every individual has different spaces in which the status of information
will not necessarily be the same. For example, it could be wrong to take a comment
made in an intimate setting and publish it to a wider circle.
The Internet is not a univocal environment: it contains all sorts of places.
Some are more risky than others for the privacy of the people who visit them. For
15 Veasman, supra note 3 at 311.
16 Pierre-Yves Gautier, “Le contenu généré par l’utilisateur” (2008) Légicom 1.
17 Supra note 12.
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example, social networking sites are configured so that people can meet others.
Sites such as MySpace and LinkedIn offer online services that bring people into
contact. Such sites can be used to increase one’s circle of friends, create work rela-
tionships, publicize musical groups, get people with the same interests together,
find old classmates, etc. One need only choose a site that meets one’s needs and
register to be potentially linked with millions of people.
The registration form generally allows you to create a basic profile, which can
contain your user name, hometown and job. The user can then complete the infor-
mation pertaining to him or her by adding details, photographs, a CV and informa-
tion on interests. The information will be contained in a personal space.
In order to contact others, users can add people to their address books by
searching for individuals who are already members of the site and asking them if
they want to become friends. Users can get in touch with people who are not site
members by inviting them to register and make contact. Some sites make it possi-
ble to import lists of contacts from email addresses so that all the people on the lists
can be sent invitation emails. If the people in question join the site, they will bring
in their contacts in turn, and the network will thus grow.
Finally, content circulating in many Web 2.0 environments is extremely vola-
tile. It can be changed by users and recombined in an infinite variety of ways. Users
can edit and change content and, thus, it cannot be thought of as definitive in the
way that professional publications used to be considered. Publishing now looks like
a continuous process in which many players with different statuses can take part.
(iii) Risks and Stakes Related to Regulation
Regulation, whether it results from technological configuration, stakeholder
activity or rules established by state authorities, generates risks. Rules are obvi-
ously meant to be followed, but in practice stakeholders will not comply with those
that are not in their interest if they see that there is little danger that they will suffer
adverse consequences if they fail to do so.
Risk is increased when roles and categories defined in the legislation of differ-
ent countries are superimposed on one another. Jan Trzaskowski notes that “[i]n the
absence of globally accepted standards for geographical delimitation of content on
the Internet, the infringement of foreign law is a risk which businesses inevitably
will run when carrying out electronic commerce.”18 In Web 2.0 environments, dif-
ferent stakeholders occupy different positions and play changing roles. The volatil-
ity can make it difficult to determine responsibility. It follows that it is difficult to
identify who is liable for content and activities. The accountability deficit tends to
increase relative uncertainty about the identity of those who will have to answer for
harmful and illegal actions.
Network habits and practices also generate regulations that can create risks for
users. Creating a site that permits any user to introduce comments or images about
other people is certainly a form of regulation by default that creates risks for the
third parties possibly concerned by the documents put online.
Users act in a network —  they interact and at the same time develop solu-
tions to problems they encounter. They find ways of minimizing the risk they face.
18 Supra note 7 at 320.
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In many situations they adopt a set of rules that govern their activities. In short,
norms themselves are partially produced in network interactions.19 However, once
they are established, they necessarily generate risks for others.
II. NETWORKED REGULATION
Once acknowledged, risk entails the duty to take precautions; it has to be man-
aged. Legal risk flows from situations in which the rights of others could be in-
fringed upon. While they are different, there are strong links between technological
and legal risk. When technological risk is acknowledged, there is almost always a
corresponding obligation to take it into account and behave accordingly. Legal risk
can also flow from the possibility of non-compliance with a law or other form of
obligation, such as a contract. Legal risks result from situations in which an indivi-
dual can be held liable.
It is unusual to employ the notion of risk with respect to law. Legal theorists
traditionally see risk in the phenomena that they are required to examine, but they
do not generally consider that the risks include the fact that punishment could fol-
low from transgressing a rule.20 However, when a management approach is taken,
legal risk is clearly a notion that needs to be considered. Managers see laws as
carrying risks. Trzaskowski points out that “[l]egal risk management is not a well-
established or well-defined concept, which, like risk management in general, is of a
proactive nature.”21 Yet, it seems clear that the legal theorists who are asked to
advise those who make decisions concerning the Internet take a legal risk manage-
ment approach.22
In a network environment, legal risk has two components: one or more norms
and an event. Legal risk flows from the conjunction of the norm and the event. The
norm may be stated in legislation or regulations, but it may also follow from a
contract or technical configuration. What is specific to a norm is that sanctions can
follow from it, in other words, adverse consequences can result from transgressing
it. Transgression is an event, and can take the form of a positive action or an omis-
sion in a concrete context. The event necessarily has to be anticipated or at least its
possibility has to be identified. The damages following from the event have to be
assessed.
In order to produce compliant behaviour, a norm or regulatory process has to
be perceived as generating more risks than benefits if it is transgressed. On the
19 David D. Johnson, Susan P. Crawford & John G. Palfrey Jr., “The Accountable In-
ternet: Peer Production of Internet Governance” (2004) 9 Va. J. L. & Tech. 1.
20 Franck Verdun, La gestion des risques juridiques, (Paris: Éditions d’organisation,
2006) at 20.
21 Supra note 18 at 321.
22 Rachel Burnt, “Legal risk management for the IT industry” (2005) 21 Computer Law
& Security Report 61; David N.Weiskopf, “The Risks of Copyright Infringement on
the Internet: A Practitioner’s Guide” (1998) 33 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1; Keith J Epstein & Bill
Tancer, “Enforcement of Use Limitations by Internet Services Providers: How to Stop
that Hacker, Cracker, Spammer, Spoofer, Flamer, Bomber” (1997) 19 Comm/Ent 661;
Karl Belgum & Hilary Rowen, “Insurance for Internet-Related Risks” (2000) Journal
of Internet Law 11.
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Internet, stakeholders assess legal risks. How else could we explain the fact that
despite the network’s universal nature and thus the certitude that websites with un-
restricted access can be visited in all countries, no site administrator has decided to
comply with all the applicable legislation of all countries? In fact, on the Internet,
effective regulation is that which generates among stakeholders a minimum thresh-
old of perception of the risks resulting from non-compliant behaviour.
A government or other regulator can take action to increase the risk associated
with certain forms of behaviour and some activities, or reduce the risks linked with
good conduct. For example, when a government adopts a strict law against some
practices, it increases the risks associated with them. The government can also put
boundaries around or limit risks to users engaging in legitimate activities. In such
cases, the risks inherent to the activities in question are necessarily borne by others.
Regulation of Web 2.0 can be seen as a set of measures designed to reinforce
one another so as to limit the risks facing cybernauts engaging in legal activities.
The normativity is deployed in the network by imposing rules on stakeholders and
inciting them to relay requirements to those over whom they have influence.
State actions will be more efficient with respect to risk if they are comple-
mented by dynamic surveillance policies and court action because those are the
conditions necessary for stakeholders to see that breaking the rules entails risks.
The risks flowing from legislation then have to be relayed to all who engage in
illegal activities.
In a network, anyone who can impose his or her will has the ability to increase
risk for others. Thus, a state can impose responsibilities on people who are within
its borders. Such people will then have to manage the risks flowing from those
obligations. They will try to ensure that their partners comply with the requirements
that they themselves have to meet and with respect to which they can be held ac-
countable. The obligations and risks will be relayed by contract or in other ways.
Regulation of the Internet results from constant temporary balancing of risks
and precautions. All stakeholders try to minimize the risk to which they are ex-
posed when they are involved in situations over which they have some effective
control. Regulation of Web 2.0 activities has to aim to increase the risks associated
with behaviour that puts others in danger, and to reduce the risks to those with
prudent conduct. Normativity usually comes into play when it is seen as appropri-
ate to adjust the relative risks borne by participants in an activity.
(a) Nodes of Normativity
In a network, norms are developed and expressed in various places that can be
considered nodes of normativity. Within its jurisdiction, state law is a major node
of normativity: those in the territory have virtually no choice but to comply because
the risks associated with non-compliance are generally high. However, people may
be tempted to run the risk and find themselves in non-compliance if they think that
the laws are enforced only rarely or that there is no clear will to apply them. Here
we can see how cyberspace is an environment in which users have a great deal of
control. If they think they can break the law with little risk of suffering conse-
quences, it is more likely that they will take the chance and engage in a prohibited
or harmful activity.
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In networked worlds such as Web 2.0, there are many nodes of normativity
and their ability to generate enough risk to make norms effective seems to be con-
stantly fluctuating.
(i) State Legislation
Criminal and civil law are major guides for cybernaut practices. For most
stakeholders in cyberspace, responsibility with respect to the laws of one or more
countries can be seen as a set of risks to be managed. Individuals and companies
have to ensure that their practices comply with the legislation that is likely to apply
and entail liability. They seek to control the risk flowing from their activities by
taking precautions against the adverse effects of enforcement of national legisla-
tion. When rules are set out in legislation, stakeholders tend to adjust their practices
so as to limit the risk that they will break those rules.
Even though it may be insufficient in itself, legislation is highly symbolic.
Most stakeholders see its very existence as a message. When legislation is en-
forced, stakeholders understand that it is better to adopt behaviour that is free of
harmful practices.
In order to have optimal results, legislation has to target all situations that can
be associated with Web 2.0 practices. Moreover, in a network, effective normativ-
ity is often that set by influential supranational legislation and the laws of powerful
countries. Network interactions and consistency with outside law have to be taken
into account when designing national legislation.
The legislation in question can cover many different forms of activity. Compe-
tition legislation, in particular provisions concerning fraudulent advertising and
false claims, and consumer protection legislation can apply to several typical forms
of Web 2.0 behaviour. Civil liability can arise out of many Web 2.0 activities. The
idea that one may have to answer for one’s actions in civil court can be a signifi-
cant risk for many Web 2.0 stakeholders. Indeed, it is largely through rules that
limit liability for some categories of stakeholders that legislators in many jurisdic-
tions have altered the risks associated with publishing information on the Internet.
For example, in US law, section 230 of the Communications Decency Act23
provides “Good Samaritans” with immunity24 with respect to content-related ac-
tions and omissions. The Communications Decency Act protects interactive com-
puter services from liability, even after they have been informed about publications
that are claimed to be defamatory or threatening.25 Only an interactive computer
service provider or user can benefit from the immunization from liability afforded
by the CDA.26 CDA section 230(f)(2) defines the expression “interactive computer
service provider” —  it is any information service, system or provider of software
that permits a number of users to access a computer server, specifically including
services and systems that provide Internet access and such systems managed by
libraries and educational institutions or the services that they offer.
23 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §230 (1996).
24 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §230(c) (1996) —  “Protection for ‘Good
Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material.”
25 Zeran v. America Online Inc., 129 F. 3d 327 (4th Cir., 1997).
26 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1) (1996).
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The well-known user-generated content sites have been able to develop in the
United States thanks to the immunity given to interactive service providers with
respect to content provided by third parties. Each country has to decide on the level
of risk that seems optimal in order to encourage the development of online services
but at the same time protect other interests, such as reputation, privacy and intellec-
tual property.
(ii) Technological Configurations
What seems characteristic of the cyberspace environment is that the normativ-
ity that is effective in it is that which is enforced immediately, such as that resulting
from technological configurations, and that which leads stakeholders to see that
there are risks. The Internet is an environment built by technology; the risks that it
involves necessarily result from normative decisions such as those that provide the
basis for technological configurations.27 This is especially clear in Web 2.0
environments.
Grimmelman notes that software configurations are automatic, immediately
enforced and have some flexibility in that software designers can set up any system
that “they can imagine and describe precisely.”28 However, regulation through leg-
islation is even more flexible, and does not share software’s lack of transparency.
Grimmelman writes: 
Frequently, those regulated by software may have no reasonable way to de-
termine the overall shape of the line between prohibited and permitted be-
havior. The plasticity of software and its automated operation also bedevil
attempts to have software explain itself. Even experts may not understand
why a program acts as it does.29
In Web 2.0, the technical architecture determines the conditions for access and
use of the resources made available to cybernauts. For example, the terms for using
MySpace provide that “MySpace performs technical functions necessary to offer
the MySpace Services, including but not limited to transcoding and/or reformatting
Content to allow its use throughout the MySpace Services.”30
In the end, the fact that Web 2.0 environments are fundamentally structured by
technology leads us to re-evaluate the conception that we tend to have of Web 2.0
as a place where users are the masters and are free to insert whatever content they
want. Indeed, users’ great latitude is a result of technological choices and configur-
ation, but would such technological choices would have been possible in a legal
environment less favourable to online service operators than that prevailing in
American law?
27 Joel R. Reidenberg, “Lex Informatica” (1998) 76 Tex. L. Rev. 553; Lawrence Lessig,
Code and Other Laws of Cyberespace (Basic Books, 1999).
28 James Grimmelman, “Regulation by Software” (2005) 114 Yale L.J. 1719 at. 1723.
29 Ibid.
30 MySpace: “Terms of Use Agreement”, 6.6ff., online: Terms & Conditions
<http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.terms>.
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(iii) Cybernaut Practices
Cybernaut practices also establish normative frameworks on the Internet. In
the Web 2.0 world, where user involvement is greater, the importance of user prac-
tices is also greater.
Edward Lee says that the emergence of user-generated content brings back
into question the traditional conceptions of law enforcement.31 Using examples of
cybernaut practices relating to copyrighted works, he argues that the formalist con-
ception of law is off-target. Intellectual property legislation has grey areas and gaps
that are only very occasionally filled by court decisions. User practices help to fill
in the holes and eliminate ambiguities in legislation. When faced with practices that
seem to be in violation of legislation, it is as if rights holders weighed the advan-
tages and disadvantages of going to court. Users adopt practices that reflect what
they see as reasonable risks, in particular, the risk of being sued.
There is general consensus on the need to ensure the existence and appropriate
spread of what stakeholders identify as “good practices”, in other words, exemplary
practices that reduce risk on Web 2.0.32
Even though customs and practices in a field of activity are often taken into
account and integrated into state law, use of that type of norm lies in its ability to
organize the behaviour and transactions of members of a community autono-
mously. Compliance with customs and practices is, in such circumstances, the es-
sential condition for a participant’s membership in the community. It is in this way
that “good practices” are a source of regulation that often complements the more
formal requirements of state law. In particular, “good practices” are often solution-
oriented so as to limit the risks that can result from some forms of behaviour.
(iv) Norms Set in International Forums
International forums are the most efficient places for developing meta-norms,
in other words, those expressed in the form of principles to be relayed in national
legislation and other places where normativity develops. Both conventional interna-
tional authorities and non-governmental organizations are places where meta-
norms are developed. They are places where people seek to identify common
denominators.
It is often in international forums that universal lines are drawn between what
is licit and illicit. In order to remain relevant given the speed of change in practices,
such authorities increasingly have to operate in networks.
Moreover, given the need to take into account a very wide spectrum of con-
texts in which norms have to apply, international deliberations lead to the develop-
ment of principles that are designed to be relayed at the normative levels of states
and other influential bodies. National legislation tends to be applied in a subsidiary
way. Abstract principles are developed in worldwide forums and then relayed in
specific cultural contexts. This is why it is possible to consider that the effective-
31 Edward Lee, “Warming Up to User-Generated Content” (2008) U. Ill. L. Rev. 1459.
32 Adam Thierer, “The MySpace-AG Agreement: A Model Code of Conduct for Social
Networking?”, online: (2008) The Progress & Freedom Foundation 15
<http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop15.1myspaceagreement.pdf>.
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ness of state law lies in its ability to efficiently relay basic values and principles
that are held to be legitimate.
(b) Ensuring Relays
The processes by which effective application of rules is achieved33 in a realm
like the Internet are major components of networked normativity. The relays are the
different means by which stakeholders receive and implement the norms they see
as relevant and compulsory.
On the Internet, the rules that users and other stakeholders consider relevant or
compulsory are those that entail risks. For example, a company that decides to op-
erate on the Internet by setting up a site where transactions can occur will necessa-
rily assess the laws and other norms that it has to follow in order to minimize its
risks. The rules it will consider relevant are those that are likely to be applied to the
activities that it carries out. Thus, a restaurant in Calgary that delivers pizzas to
local homes may consider that it is justified to place little importance on the laws in
effect in Nepal!
This is the phenomenon that explains why we do not feel we have to comply
with the requirements of all the laws of all the countries on Earth when we conduct
activities on the Internet. Indeed, we consider it necessary to comply only with the
laws that are likely to be enforced with respect to our activity. In other words, we
are careful to comply with legislation and other norms that can really be applied to
us in a significant manner. It is generally by assessing the risks associated with
non-compliance with the laws of countries with which we plan to have close ties
that we identify which national laws we should comply with when engaging in
Internet activities. For example, a company located in Québec and considering do-
ing business in the United States and Europe will not feel obliged to comply with
the laws of Nepal, even though its site could very well be viewed in Nepalese terri-
tory. However, it may find it necessary to ensure that it is in compliance with Qué-
bec, American and European law.
Internet stakeholders and users can often manage risk adequately by taking
into account activities they really perform, anticipating conflicts and identifying,
within the context, how the requirements flowing from law and norms will be re-
layed and applied in practical terms.
For example, site administrators have to adopt a policy to determine conduct
with respect to different aspects of the way their online environments function. For
that, they have to take into account what is considered illegal in the territories in
which their infrastructures are located and the virtual places where the sites could
engage in significant activity. To determine which measures should be taken, they
will necessarily have to analyze the situations in which they could be held liable.
With Web 2.0, this has to be taken even further because users have some capacity
to generate risks for other users and for the body that has set up the site.
33 “Effectiveness” [“effectivité” in French] means the ability to produce a sufficient de-
gree of compliance with rules in social practices. André-Jean Arnaud, ed., Dictionnaire
encyclopédique de théorie et de sociologie du droit, 2nd Edition, (Paris: L.G.D.J.,
1993) s.v. “effectivité.”
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Relays are a way of describing the dialogue among different stakeholders and
nodes of normativity. Stakeholders necessarily have to take cognizance of, and en-
sure they are in compliance with the rules that create risks for them. For that, they
have to relay the rules to their partners and fill in the gaps so as to ensure the rules
are applied in a concrete, effective way.
(i) Regulation Occurring on Websites
Like many online environments, Web 2.0 sites regulate user content and beha-
viour. Every site has its own internal procedures, which may involve user participa-
tion or only action by the site administrator. The procedures make it possible to
identify and deal with possible issues and risks arising from non-compliance with
legislation and other norms. These mechanisms also relay many of the rules consid-
ered imperative by the players at various levels of Web 2.0 environments.
(A) Oversight by the Site Itself
Web 2.0 sites often have moderators who check user content before or after it
is put online. An Internet site can employ moderators, or it can ask for volunteer
moderators from the public, for example, as it done on the HOTorNOT site.34
Moderation can be done before or after material is put online. When it is done,
a priori, generally all content is checked before it is published on the site.35 Thus,
people who visit sites that are moderated a priori have a lesser chance of being
involuntarily exposed to inappropriate material, since all user contributions have to
be judged as appropriate by the moderators before they can be found online. With a
posteriori moderation, users can contribute freely to the site.36 Moderators gener-
ally rely on user complaints to target the content to be monitored. They can also
submit the site to random checks. In all of these situations, it can be noted that
having a moderator can actually expose the site to liability under the common law,
as the site could be considered to be a publisher of material37.
(B) Oversight by the Site’s Users
Some Web 2.0 sites have developed monitoring schemes in which users play
major roles. This reflects the difficulty for a site with millions of pages to control
all of its content. User monitoring makes it possible to benefit from the work of an
unknown number of users who assess whether contributions are inappropriate.
34 See online: HotorNot <http://mod.hotornot.com/>.
35 The Amazon.fr site <http://www.amazon.fr/> is a good example of an Internet site
where the content is subject to a priori moderation. No user comment is put online
immediately. The site reserves the right to wait five to seven days before publication so
as to check the comments first.
36 For example, the RateMyProfessors site <http://www.ratemyprofessors.com/> uses a
posteriori moderation.
37 Michael Deturbide, “Liability of Internet Service Providers for Defamation in the US
and Britain: Same Competing Interests, Different Responses”, online: (2000) 3 J.I.L.T.
<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_3/deturbide/>.
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User ratings make it possible to manage risks that could flow from operating a
Web 2.0 site. Such monitoring is performed by visitors to the site, who rate the
content on a scale that is generally from 0 to 5.38 In principle, content that is in bad
taste or of poor quality will be given a bad rating. However, site users do not all
have the same taste. Some people may give a good rating to content that others find
disgusting. They may also give a bad rating to something that other people would
consider a masterpiece. This approach is based on the hypothesis that visitors will
not be inclined to watch videos that do not have good ratings.
Identification of inappropriate content, in other words, flagging, is one of the
most common methods used on Web 2.0 sites to encourage users to report material
that could be offensive, insulting, threatening or otherwise illegal. This method
consists in inserting with every user contribution a link that makes it possible to
report the content if it is inappropriate.39 When a person visits a Web 2.0 site and
comes face to face with child pornography, for example, he or she need only click
on the link, and a warning will be sent automatically to the site administrators,
saying that inappropriate content was found at such and such a place. Some Internet
sites invite all visitors, whether or not they are members, to report inappropriate
content; other sites allow only their members to do so.40
In order to avoid increasing the damage caused by offensive content, some
sites automatically hide the contribution that was reported until a decision has been
made on whether or not to withdraw it.41
The reporting method allows the site to count on a large number of monitors.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine that a limited number of moderators would be suffi-
cient to monitor a complete Web 2.0 site with millions of user contributions. By
counting on visitors to report offensive content, the site gains access to a larger
pool of monitors. Naturally, for such monitoring to be effective, users have to take
the time to report inappropriate content.
(C) Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
A number of Web 2.0 sites provide users with dedicated dispute resolution
mechanisms. Dispute resolution can range from simple reporting of inappropriate
content so that it can be assessed by a paid or volunteer moderator, to elaborate
38 The YouTube site <http://www.youtube.com/>, for example, allows visitors to give up
to five stars to published content.
39 The YouTube site <http://www.youtube.com/> is a good example of a site that makes
it easy for visitors to signal inappropriate content. Every video added to the site is
accompanied by a link called “Flag as Inappropriate”, which makes it simple to report
an offensive video.
40 See e.g. YouTube, online: <http://www.youtube.com/>, where you have to be a mem-
ber to report a video.
41 For example, when a complaint is made about a rating on the RateMyProfessors site
(http://www.ratemyprofessors.com/), the rating in question is automatically masked and
replaced by the note “(Rating under review)” until the comment is approved or not.
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arbitration mechanisms. The merchant-rating part of eBay42 and the English ver-
sion of Wikipedia43 have complete dispute resolution mechanisms.
Evaluation of reported content: Visitors to Web 2.0 pages are often asked to
use mechanisms on the site to report content that they consider inappropriate, for
example, by flagging it. Once the content is flagged, the grounds for the complaint
have to be analyzed before the contribution is withdrawn from the site. This is
generally the moderators’ job. Moderators look at the reported content and then
decide if there is reason to remove it.
The delay between complaint submission and withdrawal of illicit material
varies from one site to the next.44 Thus, many people could be exposed to the con-
tent during the decision process and suffer damages as a result. This is why some
sites consider it prudent to temporarily withdraw contributions that receive com-
plaints until a moderator has had time to examine them.45
The process is unilateral. It is difficult to know how moderators base their
decisions because generally everything happens in house. Some sites, however,
base their decisions on their terms of use.46
Negotiation: Some Web 2.0 sites ask parties involved in a dispute to negotiate
among themselves to solve the problem. Negotiations may involve simple discus-
sions among the parties so that they can find an equitable resolution without having
recourse to a third party.47 The solution will ideally incorporate the suggestions of
all those involved. Negotiation is a consensual process, and the parties can engage
in it or withdraw from it as they wish.
Ways of negotiating vary from one site to the next depending on the means of
communication made available to users. For example, on Wikipedia, people who
submit texts generally use the discussion page to talk about issues. When a dispute
arises concerning a Wikipedia page, the procedure is simple.48 It is designed to
42 eBay: “Resolving Feedback Dispute”, online:
<http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/feedback-disputes.html> (visited on October 30,
2007).
43 Wikipedia: “Dispute Resolution”, online: Wikipedia
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Resolving_disputes> (visited on October 30,
2007).
44 We tested the rating withdrawal system on the RateMyProfessors site
<http://www.ratemyprofessors.com> to see how long it might take between the sub-
mission of a complaint and the withdrawal of a rating. In the case of obvious violations
of the site’s rules of conduct, for which we tested by saying that a professor preferred a
certain ethnic group, the delay was relatively short: five days. In contrast, it took
around two weeks for a moderator to approve a comment that was more ambiguous and
less obviously in violation of the rules of conduct.
45 This is the method used by the RateMyProfessors site,
<http://www.ratemyprofessors.com>.
46 See e.g. RateMyProfessors, online: Rater Guidelines
<http://www.ratemyprofessors.com/rater_guidelines.jsp>, which contains the site’s
guidelines for writing a rating.
47 Karim Benyekhlef & Fabien Gélinas, Le règlement en ligne des conflits: Enjeux de la
cyberjustice, (Paris: Romillat, 2003) at 66.
48 Supra note 43.
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prevent the dispute from escalating, such as through editing and re-editing of the
article in question, or writing personal comments on it. The people involved instead
have to go to the discussion page and try to find a consensus so that the article can
subsequently be changed. Negotiation is essential because the parties cannot submit
their dispute to mediation or arbitration unless they have shown that they first tried
to iron out their differences.49
Disputes on eBay concerning ratings by co-contracting parties are also sup-
posed to go through a negotiation process. Indeed, eBay takes a very hands-off
approach to such disputes and, in the end, resolution depends on the good will of
the parties involved. Dispute resolution tools are nonetheless made available to
users; for example, through the mutual rating withdrawal, two parties can agree to
have controversial ratings withdrawn so that they are no longer counted when final
ratings are calculated.50 However, the comments remain in the parties’ files.
Mediation, unlike negotiation, involves the active presence of a third party. In
mediation, the parties agree to submit the dispute to a mediator who will help them
find a satisfactory solution.51 Unlike that of an arbitrator, the mediator’s decision is
not binding; it is only a suggestion. The parties are not required to accept the solu-
tion, and they can end the mediation process at any time.
The Wikipedia site offers its users mediation services if the people involved in
the dispute cannot come to a consensus in any other way. The party who wishes to
get help from a mediator has to fill out a form, send it to the Mediation Committee
and give the other parties to the dispute notice of his or her desire to take part in the
process.52 Mediation is a voluntary process, and the people who have received no-
tice have seven days to agree to participate in it or else it will not take place.53 If
there is agreement to engage in the process, a mediator will intervene after a few
weeks, and the parties will be able to defend their points of view.54
The eBay site sends its users to the SquareTrade site,55 which gives users
means to resolve disputes. If a problem arises between two co-contracting parties,
either party can complete a complaint form on SquareTrade giving the reasons for
their dissatisfaction. After the complaint is submitted, the opposing party will re-
ceive an email explaining that the first party has submitted a complaint, that
SquareTrade is a service designed to help resolve disputes on eBay, and that the
second party can also complete a form describing his or her version of the facts.56
49 Ibid.
50 eBay: “What is Mutual Feedback Withdrawal?”, online: How Feedback Works
<http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/questions/mutual-withdrawal.html>, (visited on
October 30, 2007).
51 Supra note 47 at 67.
52 Wikipedia: “Mediation”, online: Wikipedia
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Mediation>, (visited on October 30, 2007).
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 eBay: “SquareTrade Warranties”, online: <http://www.squaretrade.com/>.
56 Ethan Katsh and Janet Rifkin, Online Dispute Resolution: Resolving Conflicts in
Cyberspace, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001) at 181
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The next step involves negotiation, but if that does not work, SquareTrade
makes mediators available to its members. For a fee, a mediator can help resolve
the dispute.57 When a mediator is assigned, he or she takes cognizance of the case
and then suggests a solution. Both parties have to agree for the solution to be ac-
cepted. While SquareTrade’s purpose is not limited to resolving disputes over rat-
ings, it is one of the tools that can be used to come to an agreement on mutual
withdrawal of ratings.
Arbitration is a process in which people involved in a dispute decide to entrust
its resolution to an independent tribunal that will make a decision after the parties
have each presented their cases. The decision will be binding and eliminate the
possibility of recourse to the courts.58
For example, the Wikipedia site offers its users an arbitration procedure that
includes an arbitration board that has discretion to decide to hear certain cases.59
Cases that are heard by the arbitration board are in particular those that have been
referred to it by the mediation committee and those that have already gone through
all the other steps of the dispute resolution process, but remain unresolved.60
Arbitration begins when one of the parties completes a request for arbitra-
tion.61 The party must specify the procedures that have already been followed to
resolve the dispute, explain the dispute and send notice to the other parties that a
request for arbitration has been submitted.62 Next, if the case is accepted by the
arbitration board, a web page will be set up where evidence can be published and
the parties can try to persuade the arbitrators.63 Once the evidence is established,
the board will vote and the final decision will be that of the majority.64 Measures
have also been taken to prevent conflicts from dragging on —  they range from a
prohibition on editing a category of articles, to a complete ban from participating in
the Wikipedia site.65
Internal regulation mechanisms set up by various sites open to user participa-
tion are clearly designed to manage the risks inherent to operating a site where
most of the content is provided by users. These are certainly crucial locations
where the normativity that is applied effectively on the Internet is developed and
relayed, and this is especially true in Web 2.0 environments.
57 Ibid. at 183
58 Supra note 47 at 72.
59 Wikipedia: “Arbitration Policy”, online: Wikipedia
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Arbitration_policy> (visited on October 31,
2007).
60 Ibid.
61 Wikipedia: “Requests for Arbitration/Request Template”, online: Wikipedia
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Requests_for_arbitration/Request_template>
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(ii) Liability Mechanisms
Most stakeholders see liability with respect to state legislation as a set of risks
to be managed. Individuals and enterprises have to ensure that their practices com-
ply with the requirements of the legislation that could apply and could entail liabil-
ity. In the case of sites with user-generated content, the actors truly at the origin of
punishable publications cannot always be identified and may be beyond reach. A
victim may be in a situation in which an intermediary seems to be the only one able
to take responsibility for the publication of wrongful material that causes harm.
Those who provide environments to users are often easy to identify and more finan-
cially solvent that the individual at the origin of the wrongful publication. This is
why it is important to determine the extent of intermediaries’ liability in the chain
of information transmission on the Internet.66
When harm is caused, sanctions and compensation are sought. State normativ-
ity is often called in to help. Liability seems to be one of the primary loci where we
identify and define the contradictory values hidden in rights and freedoms. By
specifying what constitutes wrongful behaviour, liability regimes help to establish
the different levels and forms of precedence among basic rights. For example, a
strict liability regime can lead stakeholders to adopt measures and precautions. In
contrast, a regime in which there is great immunity for some actors can make it
possible to develop activities that would otherwise seem very risky. It is unlikely
that sites with user-generated content, such as Facebook, YouTube and rating sites
(e.g., RateMyProfessor) would have been put online in a legal environment that did
not provide the immunity in 230(a)(1)2 of the Computer Decency Act.67
(iii) Contracts
Contracts are both nodes and relays of normativity. Internet stakeholders use
contracts to try to transfer some risks to co-contracting parties. Through this, they
relay many requirements of the national legislation of the countries where the sites
are located. With Web 2.0, contracts entered into online are increasingly in an open
transaction environment where credibility and trust tend to play central regulatory
roles.68
Contracting practices make major contributions to identification and develop-
ment of the habits of Internet operators. In an environment where contracting prac-
tices are so important, the development of guides and model contracts is also a
66 Pierre Trudel, Internet Liability in Quebec Civil Law, Report prepared for the National
Judicial Institute’s 2008 Civil Law Seminar held in Ottawa on June 13, 2008; Fabrice
De Patoul, “La responsabilité des intermédiaires sur internet: les plate-formes de mise
en relation, les forums et les blogs” (2007) 27 R.D.T.I 85.
67 Computer Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. s 230(a)(1); Melissa A. Troiano, “The New Journal-
ism? Why Traditional Defamation Laws Should Apply to Internet Blogs” (2006) 55
Am. U.L.Rev. 1448; Robert G. Magee & Tae Hee Lee, “Information Conduits or Con-
tent Developers? Determining Whether News Portals Should Enjoy Blanket Immunity
from Defamation Suits” (2007) 12 Comm L. & Pol’y 369.
68 Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, “E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Con-
tracting in the Age of Online User Participation”, (2008) 14 Michigan Telecommunica-
tions and Technology L. Rev. 303–366.
262   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [7 C.J.L.T.]
relay through which principles stated in legislation and texts from influential au-
thorities are made concrete. A policy of cooperation with influential private stake-
holders is a means of accentuating the effectiveness of state action. In order to
optimize private and other sector initiatives, experiments and good practices estab-
lished in the private sector have to be promoted and encouraged. Private sector
initiatives come into play not only at the level of repression, but also at the preven-
tive level. Contracting practices play a significant role.69
A strong policy in favour of cooperation with respect to model contracts can
be an effective relay that raises awareness of risks among those most able to man-
age them. Contracts are the preferred tool for relaying legal obligations to the par-
ties who are in a position to take action.70 They are also a means of transferring
risks. For example, an insurance contract is a mechanism for transferring some
risks, and it is one of the contract-based forms of regulation that can be used to
manage risks.71
Finally, developing contracting practices helps to relay the normative princi-
ples expressed in state legislation. Such relaying is often part of a co-regulation
process.
(iv) Co-regulation Processes
The set of risks associated with Web 2.0 can be discussed, and solutions can
be found in a circle of public, private and community stakeholders. The circle may
be more or less wide, depending on the case. This explains the usefulness of co-
regulation. Self-regulation and co-regulation72 are crucial relays for norms gov-
erning Internet activities. Through these processes, legislation relevant to the vari-
ous activities taking place on the Internet is updated, adapted and applied to spe-
cific cases.
Such processes can be seen as ongoing cycles in which requirements flowing
from other normativities, such as state legislation, are systematically discussed,
evaluated and adjusted in an evolving way. For example, in October 2007, a group
of major companies, which are active on the Internet and have major copyright
interests, promoted principles concerning the publication of user-generated content.
The Principles for User Generated Content Services establish a set of goals shared
by the promoters: 
In coming together around these Principles, Copyright Owners and UGC
Services recognize that they share several important objectives: (1) the elim-
69 1267623 Ontario Inc. v. Nexx Online Inc. (1999), 46 B.L.R. (2d) 317 (Ont. S.C.J.); see
Marie-Hélène Deschamps-Marquis, “Courriels indésirables, s’abstenir!”, online:
(Octobre 1999) Juriscom.net <http://www.juriscom.net/int/dpt/dpt20.htm#note1>.
70 Vincent Gautrais, L’encadrement juridique du contrat électronique international
(Brussels: Éditions Bruylant, 1998).
71 Richard V. Ericson, Aaron Doyle & Dean Barry, Insurance as Governance (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2003) at 8.
72 Jacques Berleur & Yves Poullet, “Quelles régulations pour l’Internet?” in Jacques
Berleur, Christophe Lazaro & Robert Queck, eds., Gouvernance de la société de
l’information (Brussels-Namur: Bruylant, Presses universitaires de Namur, 2002)
133–151.
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ination of infringing content on UGC Services, (2) the encouragement of
uploads of wholly original and authorized user-generated audio and video
content, (3) the accommodation of fair use of copyrighted content on UGC
Services, and (4) the protection of legitimate interests of user privacy. We
believe that adhering to these Principles will help UGC Services and Copy-
right Owners achieve those objectives.73
The declaration then states fifteen principles concerning copyright protection
and also commitments concerning use of identification technology to accommodate
equitable use and cooperate with other stakeholders. While it is not a contract en-
tailing obligations for the signatories, the declaration seems emblematic of the way
legislation is applied in environments such as that of Web 2.0. The principles are
based on existing state legislation, and show how the law will be complied with and
applied. They also specify the circumstances in which civil action can be taken.74
Here, we can see clearly how norms are relayed in this kind of co-regulation
approach.
(v) Raising User Awareness
When a risk-management approach is taken, awareness-raising and education
gain considerable importance. Every user has to be able to recognize and manage
the risk at his or her level. The greater the user involvement, the more important it
is to ensure that the user is adequately equipped to identify and manage the risks
that have to be dealt with at his or her level. In an open environment such as the
Internet, it is impossible to postulate that a body could take the user’s place and
identify and manage risks for him or her. This is the reason for measures designed
to make users aware of risks. For example, the safety section of the terms of use of
MySpace.com contains the following warnings to users:75
MySpace makes it easy to express yourself, connect with friends and make
new ones, but who you let into your space, how you interact with them, and
how you present yourself online are important things to think about when
using social networking sites. Here are some common sense guidelines that
you should follow when using MySpace: 
• Don’t forget that your profile and MySpace forums are public
spaces. Don’t post anything you wouldn’t want the world to
know (e.g., your phone number, address, IM screen names, or
specific whereabouts). Avoid posting anything that would make
it easy for a stranger to find you, such as where you hang out
every day or a picture of you in front of your office or school.
73 Principles for User Generated Content Services, online: User Generated Content Prin-
ciples <http://www.ugcprinciples.com/>; Principles for User Generated Content Ser-
vices, Media Release, “Internet and Media Industry Leaders Unveil Principles to Foster
Online Innovation While Protecting Copyrights”, online:
<http://www.ugcprinciples.com/press_release.html>.
74 “The Principles for User Generated Content Services: A Middle-Ground Approach to
Cyber-governance” (2008) 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1387 at 1388.
75 See online:
<http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=cms.viewpage&placement=safetytips>.
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• People aren’t always who they say they are. Be careful about
adding strangers to your friends list. It’s fun to connect with new
MySpace friends from all over the world, but avoid meeting peo-
ple in person whom you do not fully know. If you must meet
someone, do it in a public place and bring a friend or trusted
adult.
• Harassment, hate speech and inappropriate content should be
reported. If you feel someone’s behavior is inappropriate, react.
Report it to MySpace or the authorities.
• Don’t post anything that would embarrass you later. It’s easy to
think that only our friends are looking at our MySpace page, but
the truth is that everyone can see it. Think twice before posting a
photo or information you wouldn’t want your parents, potential
employers, colleges or boss to see!
• Don’t say you’re over 18 if you’re not. Don’t say you’re younger
than 18 if you’re not. If MySpace customer service determines
you are under 13 and pretend to be older, we will delete your
profile. If customer service determines you are over 18 and pre-
tend to be a teenager to contact underage users, we will delete
your profile.
Information on the risks and stakes facing users also has to be updated regu-
larly. The essentially evolving nature of the environment makes it impossible to
claim that the dangers are known and mastered once and for all. New trends and
“tricks” have to be identified and their risks assessed. The best strategies for deal-
ing with them have to be discussed and conveyed to the various categories of users.
CONCLUSION
Regulation of Web 2.0 can be seen from a risk management point of view. On
the Internet, users are more active than ever. They manage risks by accepting and
transferring them, and they can increase or minimize them. The effective scope and
content of regulations controlling activities associated with Web 2.0 result from
risk management decisions by all stakeholders. The main risks on Web 2.0 flow
from the configuration of virtual spaces where people can interact. Such environ-
ments are constructed using technology, and what people can and cannot do on
them is largely related to configuration. The behaviour of users and companies that
are active on the Net also generates risks. Regulation itself, whether it results from
legislation or other sources of normativity is, in practice, perceived as a risk to be
managed.
Governments can set up measures that increase or decrease cybernauts’ risk
with respect to legislation. Once again, for Web 2.0 stakeholders, state legislation is
a risk to be managed. State law and other normativities, such as norms flowing
from technology, create more or less risk to privacy and other stakeholder interests
on the net.
Seen as a set of risks to be managed, regulation of Web 2.0 looks like a net-
work of norms that are developed and established in the many nodes of an environ-
ment that is itself networked. Norms are necessarily relayed through many
processes. The incentive to relay the requirements of a rule so that another person is
obliged to comply is a function of the rule’s ability to generate a risk that will be
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perceived as significant by those concerned. Seeing regulations in this way enables
us to explain the regulatory dynamics that have to be set up by stakeholders when
they are aware that they are running risks.
Technology-based normativity can create risks or provide solutions that limit
the impact of risks. Government regulatory work could include updating the risks
associated with some practices and activities in Web 2.0 environments. The state
and other regulators can increase or decrease risk, for example, the risk flowing
from social networking sites. Risk management decisions are taken by various indi-
viduals and bodies. Those that can impose their decisions create norms that are
relayed to other stakeholders. Governments can impose requirements that limit
risks to individuals and other bodies in their jurisdiction. On the Internet, such mea-
sures are generally perceived by stakeholders as risks to be managed and trans-
ferred to co-contracting parties. The effectiveness of regulation is a function of the
real ability to increase risks to those who engage in potentially harmful activities
and decrease risks to legitimate users. 
